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I. Background to the Caribbean and Introduction to the Caribbean
Court of Justice
The islands of the Caribbean, and many nations surrounding them,
were subject to a rich history of European colonization.1  Spain led the
colonization in 1493 and remained relatively unchallenged for over one
hundred years.2  However, in the 1600s, Britain began its colonization of
the Caribbean in full force, starting in the 1620s with unclaimed islands,
and then moving on to seize possession of claimed islands from Spain in
1655.3  Holland and France also played arose in Caribbean colonization,
but their presence in the region paled in comparison to Britain’s.4
Britain remains a key player in the region today: six “British Overseas
Territories” still exist within the Caribbean.5  Many Overseas Territories
have a domestic government, but that government is still accountable to
the Queen.6  Other Caribbean islands still voluntarily retain strong links to
the Crown by retaining membership in the Commonwealth.7  Perhaps the
most visible of these links are the ties between Caribbean domestic judi-
ciaries and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Privy Council),
the British court of highest instance.8  Both independent territories, such
as Jamaica, and independent republics, such as Trinidad and Tobago, con-
tinue to allow the Privy Council to hear appeals from their domestic courts
and render a final binding decision on criminal and civil issues.9  Cur-
rently, fourteen Caribbean territories cede full appellate jurisdiction to the
Privy Council.10
1. See B.W. HANGMAN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN 54 (2011).
2. See FACTS ON FILE, INC., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD GEOGRAPHY 145 (Robert W.
McColl ed., 1st ed. 2005).
3. See Caribbean Timeline, WORLD ATLAS, http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/
countrys/namerica/caribb/caribtimeln.htm (last visited May 7, 2014).
4. See Reaching Out, CARIBBEAN-GUIDE. INFO, http://caribbean-guide.info/past.and
.present/history/european.colonies/ (last visited May 7, 2014); JAMES FERGUSON, A TRAV-
ELER’S HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN 72 (2d ed. 2008).
5. See List of Commonwealth Countries, British Oversea Territories, British Crown
Dependencies and EU Member States, LEEDS. GOV. UK, http://www.leeds.gov.uk/docs/
List-of-eligible-countries.pdf (last visited May 7, 2014) (current Caribbean territories are
Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat and Turks and
Caicos).
6. Queen and Overseas Territories, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY,
http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchAndCommonwealth/Queen%20and%20overseas%20
territories/Queen%20and%20overseas%20territories.aspx (last visited May 7, 2014).
7. See Our History, THE COMMONWEALTH, http://thecommonwealth.org/our-history
(last visited May 7, 2014).
8. See generally Role of the JCPC, JUDICIAL COMM. OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, http://www
.jcpc.uk/about/role-of-the-jcpc.html (last visited May 7, 2014) (ten Caribbean nations
are currently part of the Commonwealth).
9. Id. (the standard for a domestic court granting a petitioner leave for appeal for
criminal matters is much higher than that for civil matters).
10. Id. (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica,
Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos, Cayman Islands, and Montserrat are
the fourteen Caribbean territories that currently have appellate access to the Privy
Council).
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Since the British legacy is strong in large parts of the Caribbean, many
states began advocating for increased independence from their former col-
onizers and increased connection with their island neighbors.11  This
movement manifested itself in multiple ways, a major one being the forma-
tion of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM).12  In
1973, four major Caribbean countries signed the Treaty of Chaguaramas to
create CARICOM, a regional organization with the goal of fostering a com-
mon market, increasing the economic independence of member states and
strengthening trade between those states.13  CARICOM later revised its
formative treaty to include the CARICOM Single Market and Economy
goal, thereby shifting the organization away from a common market and
towards a more cohesive single market.14
However, despite the broad goals of CARICOM, many states sought to
take regional independence further and sever the last vestiges of colonial-
ism from their local judiciaries; this desire was channeled into the Carib-
bean Court of Justice (CCJ).15  The CCJ officially came into being in 2001
as the product of consensus among twelve CARICOM member states that
joined together to sign the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of
Justice.16  Under the agreement, jurisdiction would be available to any
member of CARICOM as well as any other state that CARICOM should
choose to invite.17
One of the most striking aspects of the CCJ is that it holds both appel-
late and original jurisdiction.18  Under its original jurisdiction, the court
could hear matters regarding international law, most notably matters of
11. See History of the Caribbean Community, CARIBBEAN CMTY. SECRETARIAT, http://
www.caricom.org/jsp/community/history.jsp?menu=community (last visited May 7,
2014).
12. See id.  Oddly enough, the major impetus for forming CARICOM was the failure
of the British West Indies Federation, Britain’s attempt to bring Caribbean nations
together under Crown supervision.  See A Brief History of the Caribbean Community,
CARIBBEAN CMTY.SECRETARIAT, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/caricom_history
.jsp?menu=community (last visited May 7, 2014).
13. See Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, Chaguaramas art. 4, July4,
1973, available at http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/original_treaty-text.pdf
[hereinafter Treaty of Chaguaramas].
14. See Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community
Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, July 5, 2001, available at http://
www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised_treaty-text.pdf.
15. See generally De´sire´e P. Bernard, The Caribbean Court of Justice: A New Judicial
Experience, 37 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 219, 220– 21 (2009) (describing the Caribbean Court
of Justice as a “culmination of aspirations” to create a court of last resort in the Carib-
bean and a replacement for the “legac[y] of British colonialism bequeathed to its former
colonies”).
16. See About the CCJ: FAQs, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.carib-
beancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/faqs (last visited May 7, 2014).  Although the court
was technically established in 2001, it would not begin operating until April, 2005. Id.
17. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice art. II, Feb. 14, 2001,
available at http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/agreement_ccj
.pdf.
18. See id. art. III.
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regional law pertaining to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramus.19  Here,
unlike many general international tribunals, the jurisdiction of the court is
compulsory–  judgments rendered by the court are automatically binding
and require no pre-existing agreement.20  Under appellate jurisdiction of
the CCJ, the court could operate as a traditional court of final instance,
with appeal by right for certain limited issues and appeal by permission of
the court for any criminal or civil matter.21  However, states must volunta-
rily sign on to the court for it to have appellate jurisdiction.22  Issues
between member states, between CARICOM nationals, or between nation-
als and the state are all justiciable under the CCJ.23
CARICOM had lofty ambitions for both original and appellate jurisdic-
tion under the CCJ, but member states have been slow to enact domestic
legislation that would give mandatory appellate jurisdiction to the court.24
As of 2014, only Barbados, Guyana and Belize have enacted such legisla-
tion.25  In fact, even Trinidad and Tobago, the nation that hosts the seat of
the court,26 has yet to allow the CCJ full appellate jurisdiction.27  This hesi-
tancy may be an inauspicious sign for growth of the CCJ.  Member states
may be delaying severing ties with the Privy Council for fear of scaring
away foreign investors who may not yet have confidence in the legitimacy
or power of the CCJ.28  Despite these lingering dark clouds, many still have
great hope for the CCJ.29
19. See Sheldon A. McDonald, The Caribbean Court of Justice: Enhancing the Law of
International Organizations, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 930, 931 (2004).
20. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. R
XVI.
21. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. R
XXV (appeals by right are for issues including, but not limited to, those relating to mar-
riage, interpretation of domestic constitutions and any matter with a value of over
$25,000 Eastern Caribbean Currency).
22. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. R
XXV.
23. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. R
XII.
24. See Bernard, supra note 15, at 223. R
25. About the CCJ: FAQs, supra note 16.  However, both Barbados and Guyana have R
been using the court to its fullest.  Bernard, supra note 15, at 223. R
26. See Agreement Establishing the Seat of the Caribbean Court of Justice and the
Offices of the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission between the Govern-
ment of Trinidad and Tobago and the Caribbean Community preamble, Apr.30, 1999,
available at http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/ccj_seat.jsp?
menu=secretariat&prnf=1. Note, however, that the court is itinerant and may travel to
any country that falls under its jurisdiction. See About the CCJ: FAQs, supra note 16. R
27. See Sir Ronald Sanders, Trinidad and the CCJ –  Still Loitering, CARIBBEAN 360.COM
(Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.caribbean360.com/index.php/opinion/573091.html#axzz
28MbRtHsi.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., All Eyes on CCJ, Says EU Trade Law Expert, TRINIDAD GUARDIAN (Sept.
28, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2012-09-27/all-eyes-ccj-says-eu-trade-law-
expert (“ ‘People around the world are looking at this court with great interest, mixed
jurisdictions, trade, private law and appeal jurisdictions, plus some constitutional
authority. It’s a remarkable creation coming out of Caricom. I think it has the potential
for helping to assist Caricom states in further promoting . . . integration.’”).
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This Note will aim to analyze the efficacy of the CCJ from a compara-
tive perspective.  Part I of this Note will take a vertically comparative
stance, comparing the CCJ as a court of appellate jurisdiction with the
Privy Council to show that the new court can offer a superior judicial
option.  Part II will take a horizontally comparative stance, using a political
lens to juxtapose the CCJ with the European Court of Justice (ECJ), as an
example of a relatively successful regional court, and the South African
Development Community Tribunal (SADCT), as an example of a relatively
unsuccessful regional court.  This Part posits that the efficacy of the CCJ
currently lies at a midpoint on the spectrum set by these two regional
courts, but that mechanisms exist that can allow the CCJ to grow towards
the success of the ECJ.  The analysis will focus on the CCJ, ECJ and SADCT
as regional courts from the viewpoints of (1) political sustainability, (2)
economic sustainability and (3) rate of growth and efficacy. Part III offers a
conclusion.
II. The CCJ Measured Against the Privy Council
A. Structural Issues
Although CARICOM created the CCJ as a replacement for the Privy
Council, it did not fully replicate the British system; instead it chose to
copy certain practices while creating other divergent ones. As for the basic
structure of the court, both the CCJ and the Privy Council mandate that
there be a President of the court,30 and both expect a smaller selection of
judges to be called from a larger pool of eligible judges for any particular
case31 (as opposed to “en banc” courts like the United States Supreme
Court,32 where all nine judges ordinarily sit for every case33).  Five judges
normally sit on the Privy Council for Commonwealth appeals,34 while
three to five usually sit on the CCJ for CARICOM appeals.35
Even though the number of deciding judges on both courts may be
similar, large differences exist between the pools of jurists from which the
two courts may call judges.  CARICOM established an initial limit to the
number of judges that may be a part of the pool: no more than nine judges
may serve at any time, not including the President.36  In order to become a
30. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. R
IV; Judicial Committee Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 1 (Eng.).
31. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. R
XI; JUDICIAL COMM. OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE DIRECTION 1, § 1 (2009), available at
http://www.jcpc.uk/docs/practice-direction-01.pdf.
32. See Marcel Berlins, The Number of Judges in the Privy Council, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 27, 2004, 9:27 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/23/law.theguar
dian1.
33. FED. LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CTR., LEGAL DIVISION HANDBOOK 221 (2012).
34. JUDICIAL COMM. OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL PRACTICE DIRECTION 1, supra note 31, §1.
35. See Appellate Jurisdiction Judgments, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, http://
www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/judgments-proceedings/appellate-jurisdiction-judg
ments (last visited May 7, 2014).
36. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. R
IV. Currently, however, the president of the CCJ is only accompanied by 5 other justices.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN308.txt unknown Seq: 6 12-JAN-15 11:49
740 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
part of the CCJ jurist pool, an individual must be appointed by a simple
majority of the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission, an eleven
member board made up of relatively independent individuals appointed by
CARICOM states.37
The Privy Council, on the other hand, employs a different system.  The
legislation that enabled the court imposes no explicit limit on the number
of judges that may serve as part of the pool of eligible jurists.38  The com-
bination of the enabling legislation made under it means that not only are
U.K. judges part of the pool, but, technically, the Chief Justice of the high-
est courts in certain Caribbean Commonwealth countries are as well.39  In
fact, determining the exact number of judges at any particular time can be
difficult: one estimate in 2009 placed the number of Privy Council judges
at ninety-five, three of whom were Caribbean judges.40  Despite this, the
major decision makers in the pool are the Privy Councilors who also serve
as judges on the U.K. Supreme Court and, in fact, are the only ones listed
on the Privy Council website.41
The Privy Council has attracted a lot of criticism for the fact that it
encompasses such a large number of judges and only uses a fraction of
them for any one appeal.42  Thus, the decision for any one case depends, to
a large extent, on the judges called; the number of combinations of judges
available means that different decisions could be rendered for very similar
fact patterns.43  This issue becomes especially relevant when an appeal
comes from a Caribbean country.  With only roughly three Caribbean
Privy Councilors44 and a panel of at least five judges sitting for appeals
from the Caribbean,45 simple math dictates that it is difficult for the Carib-
bean voice to gain a majority.  This problem becomes compounded, and
eventually insurmountable, when the panel calls for more than five judges,
See Judges of the Caribbean Court of Justice, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www
.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/judges (last visited May 7, 2014). The lack of
a full court is not for lack of appointment: three judges voluntarily resigned, one being
the first President of the court. Id.
37. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. R
IV. The makeup of the Commission is an interesting one: it includes permanent slots
reserved for nominees from two Caribbean bar associations, jurists nominated by the
deans of Caribbean law schools and “two persons from civil society.” Id. art. V.
38. See Privy Council— The Pool of Judges, UKSC BLOG (Oct. 11, 2009), http://uksc-
blog.com/privy-council-the-pool-of-judges (“Although . . . [the] website only covers 11
Supreme Court Justices, the available pool of judges is, in fact, much larger.  The precise
number is not listed and is not easy to determine.”).
39. See id. (explaining that the head judges of the superior courts in Trinidad and
Tobago, Barbados, the Bahamas and Jamaica are part of the pool).
40. See id.
41. See Biographies of the Justices, JUDICIAL COMM. OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, http://www
.jcpc.uk/about/biographies-of-the-justices.html (last visited May 7, 2014).
42. See, e.g., Berlins, supra note 32. R
43. See id. (“How many times have I heard, ‘If only Lord G had been there instead of
Lord T, the result would have been the opposite’?”).
44. See Privy Council— The Pool of Judges, supra note 38. R
45. See JUDICIAL COMM. OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL PRACTICE DIRECTION 1, supra note 31.
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as it does in some cases.46
The concern that the structure of the Privy Council stifles the voice of
Caribbean interests has spurred severe criticism from Caribbean jurists.47
Of course, because the CCJ chooses panels of three to five from a body now
comprising six judges, the choice of judges, and the political and ideologi-
cal standpoints they bring with them, will affect the holding of any case.
However, with a limit of nine judges, this role is much less influential than
in the Privy Council.  Moreover, with CARICOM and its appointees select-
ing judges for the CCJ, Caribbean critics should have a lot less to say about
their ultimate arbiters not reflecting the values of Caribbean society.
Although Caribbean ideals now had a voice, a major concern arose
regarding the CCJ as a regional body: Caribbean judges would be more
susceptible to corruption than the predominantly British judges in the
Privy Council.48  This concern was born from a view among Caribbean
residents that their national judiciaries had failed as independent bodies
and were subject to political influence.49  CARICOM sought to combat this
perception, and perhaps reality, by incorporating mechanisms into the CCJ
to ensure the independence of its judges.50
The first way CARICOM sought to isolate judges from political influ-
ence was by ensuring that their salaries, as well as funds required for main-
tenance of the court, do not flow directly from any one contracting state.51
46. See, e.g., Pratt v. Att’y Gen. for Jam., [1993] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Jam.) (seven judges sat for this appeal).
47. See, e.g., Hugh M. Salmon, The Caribbean Court of Justice: A March with Destiny,
2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 231, 235 (2000) (citing the following question that had been printed
in a major Caribbean newspaper and answering it in favor of the CCJ: “Who, after all, is
best suited to Judge us - the Privy Council judges, who are certainly remote from our
experience and who, by definition, are not au courant either with our society or our
social mores or local magistrates and judges who are steeped in the society’s particular
modes and expression and behavior?”).
48. See, e.g., Sir Dennis Byron & Maria Dakolias, The Regional Court Systems in the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and the Caribbean, in SMALL STATES, SMART
SOLUTIONS: IMPROVING CONNECTIVITY AND INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC SER-
VICES 91, 114 (Edgardo M. Favaro, ed. 2008).
49. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: UNDP
Citizen Sec. Survey 2010: Summary of Findings, 31 (2012, )available at http://www.undp
.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/
Latin%20America%20and%20Caribbean%20HDR/C_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf
[hereinafter UNDP Report] (stating that a staggering 52.5% of the Caribbean public, an
average that includes 70.2% of the Trinidadian public, believe that “politically connected
criminals go free,” that 37.2% of the Caribbean public believe that their judges are cor-
rupt and that 49.6% of the Caribbean public believe that their entire justice system is
corrupt);see also Seanna Annisette, CCJ President Stresses the Importance of a Quality Judi-
ciary, GRENADA BROADCAST (Aug. 22, 2012), http://grenadabroadcast.com/news/all-
news/14180-caribbean-court-of-justice.  The President of the CCJ has stated that,
although the public perception may be “harsh and inaccurate,” Caribbean judiciaries
must respond to this perception by setting procedural safeguards to ensure judicial inde-
pendence and by training judges to identify and overcome their unconscious biases. Id.
50. See, e.g., Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, R
art. XXVI, XXX (requiring member states to help enforce the court’s judgments).
51. See Revised Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund
art. IV– V, Jan. 13– 27, 2004 [hereinafter Agreement Establishing CCJ Trust Fund].
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Instead, all contracting states were required to make an initial payment into
a trust fund and commit to making subsequent payments into that fund,52
with an agreement establishing monetary penalty for non-payment.53  Con-
tracting states were required to submit payment without reservation to the
way in which the money was spent.54  Moreover, the fund could not solicit
or accept any extra donations unless all contracting states agreed to do
so.55
The members of the board of trustees who were chosen to administer
the fund were also chosen with the intent of dampening political influ-
ence.56  Rather than appoint governmental representatives or private finan-
cial experts, CARICOM chose to staff the board with leaders of nine
Caribbean institutions that represent both public and private interests;57
for example, CARICOM’s interest is represented by the Secretary General of
the body, a scholarly interest is represented by the Vice Chancellor of the
University of the West Indies, and a financial interest is represented by the
President of the Association of Indigenous Banks of the Caribbean.58  Any
decision regarding the fund requires consensus or, if not, two-thirds major-
ity.59  The combination of the composition of the board and the proce-
dures in place to limit its members’ actions makes it difficult for any
government to improperly affect CCJ decision making.60
Overall, the structure of the CCJ seems to have adequately assessed
and addressed the needs of the Caribbean region.  It has created a model
somewhat inspired by, but altogether different from, its colonial
predecessor.
B. Practical Issues: Individual and State Costs
Sitting as courts of appellate jurisdiction, the CCJ and the Privy Coun-
cil have similar procedure, but key differences exist that could affect a liti-
gant’s choice of forum and a country’s choice in deciding whether or not to
cede jurisdiction away from the Privy Council and to the CCJ.  A large part
of these differences manifest themselves in money and time related costs.
For the individual litigant, a switch to the CCJ means, almost always, a
reduction in the fixed costs associated with court filing expenses and varia-
ble costs associated with legal fees.  As a starting point for fixed costs, the
cost of filing an appeal with the Privy Council is more than five times
52. See id. Annex.
53. The Caribbean Court of Justice Background Paper, CARICOM SECRETARIAT (Oct.20,
2000), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community_organs/caribbean_court.jsp?menu=cob
[hereinafter CCJ Background Paper].
54. Agreement Establishing CCJ Trust Fund, supra note 51, art. IV, § 8. R
55. Id. art. IV, § 2.
56. See id. art.VI.
57. See id.
58. Id. (the list also includes a legal interest represented by the President of the
Organization of Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Associations, and a labor interest repre-
sented by the President of the Caribbean Congress of Labor).
59. Id. art. VIII, §§5– 6.
60. See McDonald, supra note 19, at 1010.
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greater than filing an appeal with the CCJ.61  A comparison of other associ-
ated filing costs for both courts reveals a similar ratio; however, the CCJ
does list multiple marginal fees for smaller court transactions whereas the
Privy Council lists no such fees at all.62  But, the biggest advantage of the
CCJ is that the court has been willing to grant appeals in forma pauperism,
waiving all filing costs when it deems them too burdensome on an individ-
ual litigant.63  Though the Privy Council does allow appeals in forma pau-
perism, it does so on a more limited basis.64
The real expense for the litigant, however, comes with the practical
effect of having to litigate a case in the U.K.65  Litigants must either buy
plane tickets for themselves or find and hire an English licensed barrister;
in some cases they must do both.66  Additionally, litigants must pay a
travel visa application fee to the U.K. embassy, and must also pay for
accommodations in the U.K. that last for the duration of the litigation.67
All of this produces a very expensive appeals process: one estimate places
the average total cost at around $65,000 USD.68  This cost becomes even
more prohibitive when one considers the relative weakness of Caribbean
currencies in comparison to the British Pound.69  This means that the
61. Compare The Judicial Committee (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules Order 2009, 16
(Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/224/pdfs/
uksi_20090224_en.pdf (stating a cost of £220, or roughly $350 USD in 2013, for filing
an application for permission to appeal along with the actual notice of appeal), with The
Caribbean Court of Justice (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules, 58 (June 24, 2005), available at
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/ccjapprules.pdf
(requiring no fee for filing an application for permission to appeal and stating a cost of
$60 USD for filing a notice of appeal).
62. Compare The Judicial Committee (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules Order 2009,
supra note 61, at 16 (listing only basic costs associated with initial filing), with The
Caribbean Court of Justice (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules, 2005, supra note 61, at 58
(requiring payment to the court for transactions such as “notice of appointment of attor-
ney-at-law” and “acknowledgement of service [for each respondent]”).
63. Duke E.E. Pollard, The Caribbean Court of Justice (“the CCJ”): Who Stands to
Gain, Presented at the Fifteenth Public Lecture of Management Institute for National
Development (MIND), 21(Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://chooseavirb.com/ccj/wp-
content/uploads/2011/papers_addresses/The%20CCJ%20-%20Who%20Stands%20to
%20Gain.pdf (the author of this paper was a Justice of the CCJ at the time it was
written).
64. Id.
65. See The Privy Council vs. The Privileges of the CCJ, 7 NEWSBELIZE.COM (May 13,
2010), http://www.7newsbelize.com/sstory.php?nid=16886.
66. See id.  One Jamaican appellant reported paying roughly $270,000 USD in legal
fees to a British law firm. Daraine Luton, Closer to Quitting the Queen, THE JAMAICA
GLEANER (July 27, 2012), http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120727/lead/lead6
.html.
67. See Luton, supra note 66. R
68. See Court of Appeal, LEXPRESS.MU (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.lexpress.mu/ser
vices/archive-93766-the-privy-council-should-hold-sittings-in-mauritius-as-from-next-
september.html;see also We Cannot Wait Until Everything is State of the Art, JAMAICA
GLEANER (Dec. 14, 1999), http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/19991214/f4.html (citing
statement made by Attorney General of Jamaica that an appeal to the Privy Council from
Jamaica would cost at least $87,500 USD).
69. See, e.g., British Pound Exchange Rate, EXCHANGERATES.ORG.UK, http://www
.exchangerates.org.uk/British-Pound-GBP-currency-table.html (last visited May 7, 2014)
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Privy Council is accessible only to two major groups: the very wealthy and
certain inmates on death row who are able to secure pro bono legal service
from British lawyers.70
The CCJ, in most cases, offers a much less expensive option to liti-
gants.71  First, the very motivation behind the formation of CARICOM
means that litigants will not have to exhaust resources pursuing a visa to
travel to any CARICOM state where the CCJ sits.72  Second, by reason of
sheer distance, travel to Trinidad, the current seat of the CCJ, is much
cheaper than travel to the U.K.73  Moreover, since the court is itinerant, it
can travel to signatory states to hear cases, lessening the need for litigants
to travel at all.74  In fact, physical travel itself may become obsolete because
of the court’s e-filing system that has been hailed as “impressive.”75  The
seat of the court has already begun utilizing the system to conduct hearings
electronically.76  Other CARICOM signatories have installed teleconferenc-
ing equipment similar to that of the seat of the court; this lessens the need
for travel for procedures like depositions and testimony.77  Finally, because
of the relatively small difference between exchange rates in the Carib-
bean,78 the average cost of Caribbean legal counsel proves cheaper than
British counsel.79
Although a switch from the Privy Council to the CCJ would likely
mean reduced costs to an individual litigant, it also means increased costs
(stating exchange rates of 3:1 for the Barbadian dollar; 10:1 for the Trinidad Tobago
dollar; and 186:1 for the Jamaican dollar).
70. See Anthony Gifford, The Death Penalty: Developments in Caribbean Jurispru-
dence, 37 INT’L J. OF LEGAL INFO., 195, 202 (2009).
71. See Vasciannie Says No to Jamaican Final Court, Backs CCJ, JAMAICA OBSERVER
(June 18, 2012), http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Vasciannie-says-no-to-Jamai-
can-final-court— backs-CCJ_11717888 [hereinafter Vasciannie Backs CCJ].
72. See Free Movement in the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), CAR-
ICOM SECRETARIAT, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/skill.jsp?menu=csme
(last visited May 7, 2014).
73. See Vasciannie Backs CCJ, supra note 71. R
74. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. R
III; see also About the CCJ: FAQs, supra note 16 (more explicitly stating that the court R
could travel to any contracting state).
75. See Maya Wolfe-Robinson & Owen Bowcott, The Global Fight to End Capital Pun-
ishment, THE GUARDIAN (May 6, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/
06/global-fight-end-capital-punishment.
76. See, e.g., Caribbean Court of Justice Stops Government from Selling B.T.L. Shares,
NEWS 5 (Aug. 16, 2011), http://edition.channel5belize.com/archives/59636; CCJ
Teleconference Sitting, CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE BLOG (Jan. 21, 2008), http://carib-
beancourtofjustice.blogspot.com/2008_01_01_archive.html.
77. See Privy Council Does Cost Something, CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE BLOG (Jan. 9,
2012), http://caribbeancourtofjustice.blogspot.com/2012/01/privy-council-does-cost-
something.html.
78. See, e.g., Trinidad Tobago Dollar Exchange Rate Table, EXCHANGERATES.ORG.UK,
http://www.exchangerates.org.uk/Trinidad-Tobago-Dollar-TTD-currency-table.html (last
visited May 7, 2014) (stating exchange rates of Trinidad Tobago Dollars, including 3:1
for Barbadian Dollars, 3:1 for Belize Dollars, and 1:17 for Jamaican Dollars).
79. See IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE HOME OFFICE, U.K., Jamaica
Country Report, 5.43 (Apr., 2005) (reporting a statement printed in a Trinidadian
newspaper).
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to a contracting state.  One of the major benefits of the Privy Council was
that it did not require Caribbean states to pay to maintain the court even
though they could access it;80 instead, the Privy Council acted as a form of
“pro bono service.”81  The CCJ on the other hand, requires contracting
states to collectively pay to fully finance the court, including employees’
salaries and maintenance of the seat of the court.82  Contracting states do
not pay equal shares, but instead contribute based on the “public revenues”
of the state.83  Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are the highest contribu-
tors,84 committing roughly $3,000,000 USD to the court each year.85
Other countries, including Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia, only commit
about $220,000 USD per year.86
As discussed earlier, a state’s contributions to the CCJ do not flow
directly from the state’s budget to the court; instead states pay into a trust
fund administered by a board of trustees.87  The court is then funded by
the money contributed to the trust as well as any profits the trust produces
through financial investments conducted by the board.88  CARICOM’s
hope was that the expenses of the CCJ would be entirely offset by income
generated from the fund.89  Thus, contracting states must still pay their
annual dues even if the trust fund generates profits.  In fact, each con-
tracting state, on signing the Revised Treaty, was mandated to make provi-
sions in its national budget for payment for the first five years of the plan.90
To reinforce this provision, each state was also required to individually
post a bond worth five times the value of its annual payment.91  Failure of a
state to meet future payments would result incomplete forfeiture of the
bond.92
The trust fund system makes for an expensive burden on a contracting
state.  States are bound to their initial agreements and face forfeiture of a
large sum of money should they become unwilling or unable to finance the
CCJ.  Also, because CARICOM set the value of the trust fund at
80. See Robert Collie, Use CCJ Funding to Improve Our Own Courts, JAMAICA GLEANER
(Jan. 5, 2012), http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120105/cleisure/cleisure4.html.
81. See Privy Council’s Complaint, BBCCARIBBEAN.COM, http://www.bbc.co.uk/carib
bean/news/story/2009/09/090922_privyccjphillips.shtml (last updated Sept. 24,
2009).
82. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. R
XXVIII.
83. Id.
84. See Agreement Establishing CCJ Trust Fund, supra note 51, Annex.
85. See Rickey Singh, The ‘Catastrophe’ Warning on CCJ, JAMAICA OBSERVER (Mar. 27,
2011), http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/The— catastrophe— warning-on-
CCJ_8576237.
86. See Agreement Establishing CCJ Trust Fund, supra note 51, Annex. R
87. Id. art. IV– V.
88. Id. art. IV.
89. See CCJ Trust Fund, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.caribbean
courtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/ccj-trust-fund (last visited May 7, 2014).
90. See CCJ Background Paper, supra note 53.
91. See id.
92. See id.
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$100,000,000 USD,93 states must contribute their share for at least nine
years to meet the Board’s target.  Moreover, if investments under the trust
fund generate losses instead of profits, as they did in 2009, the nature of
contracting states’ obligations becomes unclear.94
Fundamentally, the CCJ trust scheme means that the bill previously
footed by the Privy Council shifts directly to the governments of con-
tracting Caribbean states and consequently burdens those states.  Liti-
gants, on the other hand, benefit from the switch, as they gain a more
physically and financially accessible court.  And, in fact, contracting gov-
ernments may save resources when they act as parties to litigation,95 and
can offset costs by utilizing the CCJ in place of the Privy Council.  Also,
though the trust fund, like any investment, may pose risk to the initial con-
tributions of contracting states, it can prove to be fruitful.  In 2006 and
2007, before the global financial crisis, investments from the fund were
able to generate profits of about $5,000,000 USD each year.96
Accordingly, a switch from the Privy Council to the CCJ yields three
overall effects regarding money and time related resources: (1) a net benefit
to litigants, (2) a net loss to Caribbean governments, albeit a loss that is
capable of being offset, and (3) a large net benefit to the Privy Council
itself.97
C. Jurisprudential Issues
This Note, having dealt with base concerns regarding the general
structure of the CCJ and its physical cost, will now move on to a more
intangible issue: the extent to which the CCJ has been able to replicate the
judicial efficacy of the Privy Council.  The following analysis proceeds by
inspecting (1) the effect of the court on the development of the Caribbean
legal community, and (2) the extent to which the court is actually being
utilized.
Regarding the court’s impact on the Caribbean legal community, the
CCJ has enabled the legal community to grow in ways unprecedented for
93. See CCJ Trust Fund, supra note 89. R
94. See Global Crisis Hits CCJ Trust Fund, CARIBBEAN 360 (July 6, 2009), http://www
.caribbean360.com/news/global-crisis-hits-ccj-trust-fund (noting that the Jamaican
prime minister’s ambiguous statement that CARICOM member states were now on
notice to “review the state of the fund”).
95. See, e.g., Pratt v. Att’y Gen. for Jam., [1993] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Jam.).
96. CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE TRUST FUND, Report of the Board of Trustees, 5(2006),
available at http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/trustees/annual_report06/page_2-5
.pdf; CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE TRUST FUND, Report of the Board of Trustees, 5(2007),
available at http://chooseavirb.com/ccj/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/CCJTF_Annual_
Report_2007.pdf. But see CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE TRUST FUND, Report of the Board of
Trustees, 8(2008), available at http://chooseavirb.com/ccj/wp-content/uploads/2011/
06/CCJTF-Annual-Report-2008.pdf (declaring a loss of almost $25,000,000 USD).
97. See Privy Council’s Complaint, supra note 81.  The U.K. Chief Justice, himself a R
Privy Councilor, expressed a desire for Caribbean territories to wean themselves off of
the Privy Council, since cases originating from the Caribbean were consuming a dispro-
portionate amount of court time and resources. Id.
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the region.  As stated in the prior subsection, Caribbean appellants to the
Privy Council were usually either the very rich or those sentenced to
death.98  While this posed an accessibility problem, it also posed a juris-
prudential one as well: the range of precedent generated by the highest
court for the Caribbean was restricted to narrow categories.99  The area of
law encompassed by the wide gap between capital punishment and high
finance was left primarily to small domestic courts of individual Caribbean
nations.  As a result, different decisions were more likely to be rendered for
similar fact patterns, creating an inconsistency that becomes especially
troublesome when Caribbean-wide CARICOM laws are at issue.100  The
CCJ has addressed this problem by providing a forum to create jurispru-
dence in the midground of Caribbean law where the Privy Council was
previously unable to tread.  In the three years following the CCJ’s incep-
tion, civil appeals petitioned to the court outnumbered criminal appeals
petitioned by almost seven to one, whereas, under the Privy Council, civil
appeals had never outnumbered criminal appeals.101  Half of the civil peti-
tions filed in the CCJ were from appellants the CCJ deemed too poor to pay
filing costs and roughly one third of these petitions were granted.102
The combination of the CCJ’s lower cost and the court’s willingness to
grant forma pauperism has allowed the court to hear the types of Carib-
bean cases that the Privy Council had never known.  The issues in these
cases have included a property dispute between two indigent tenants,103 a
public housing agency’s contractual obligation to a signatory’s next of
kin,104 the admissibility of a police officer’s testimony in a case of child
molestation,105 a governmental taking,106 and a civil servant employee’s
dismissal through the statutory abolishment of his position.107  The CCJ
also continues to hear the former Privy Council appeal specialties— capital
punishment108 and high finance109— as well.
98. See Gifford, supra note 70, at 202. R
99. See Privy Council Does Cost Something, supra note 77 (stating that the cost of R
appeals to the Privy Council limits the number of people who can appeal, leaving the
appeals process to wealthy individuals and big businesses).
100. See Karen E. Bravo, CARICOM, the Myth of Sovereignty, and Aspirational Economic
Integration, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 145, 196– 97 (2005).
101. See POLLARD, supra note 63, ¶ 3.2, at 21. R
102. See id.
103. Ross v. Sinclair, CCJ Appeal No. CV 13 of 2007, ¶ 1– 6 (Caribbean Ct. Just.
2008) (describing appellant as “blind and virtually penniless” before approving forma
pauperis).
104. See id. ¶ 6– 7.
105. Thomas v. State, CCJ Appeal No CR 3 of 2006, ¶ 14 (Caribbean Ct. Just. 2008)
(addressing an appellant who faced a ten-year prison sentence).
106. Toolsie Persaud Ltd. v. Andrew James Investments Ltd., CCJ Appeal No CV 1 of
2007, ¶ 1– 3 (Caribbean Ct. Just. 2008).
107. Campbell v. Att’y Gen. for Barb., CCJ Appeal No CV 2 of 2008, ¶ 2– 4 (Caribbean
Ct. Just. 2009).
108. Grazette v. The Queen, CCJ Appeal No. CR1 of 2009, ¶ 1 (Caribbean Ct. Just.
2009).
109. L.O.P. Inv. Ltd. v.  Demerara Bank Ltd., CCJ Appeal No CV 4 of 2008, ¶ 6– 9, 11
(Caribbean Ct. Just 2009) (involving a claim made by an investment company against a
bank for roughly $490,000 USD).
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The diversity of cases being handled by the CCJ has started to address
the perceived need, among Caribbean citizens, for a body of jurisprudence
tailored to the nuances of Caribbean society.110  This development of law
is not only beneficial to the legal community in the abstract sense of refin-
ing Caribbean law, but also in the sense that it has given Caribbean legal
professionals an opportunity to hone their skills outside of the limited,111
domestic context.112  Nearly all the lawyers arguing cases in front of the
CCJ have been Caribbean citizens.113
Even given all the benefits afforded by the CCJ, the court is only truly
beneficial if litigants actually use it.  An initial glance at the CCJ’s judicial
history appears to illustrate this point.  In the first seven years during
which the court operated, it only pronounced a total of seventy-three judg-
ments: sixty of them under appellate jurisdiction114 and thirteen under
original jurisdiction.115  For appellate cases, this seeming disuse has not
been a product of litigants failing to use the court, but rather of states fail-
ing to enact domestic legislation that would allow its citizens to appeal to
the CCJ instead of the Privy Council.116  Only Barbados, Guyana and
Belize have enacted such enabling legislation.117  If the analysis ended
here, it would seem to suggest that, practically, the CCJ has failed as a
replacement for the Privy Council; however, a deeper analysis reveals that
this is not as damning a fact as it seems.
First of all, citizens within the three states that have ceded appellate
jurisdiction to the CCJ are appealing to the court more than they did to the
Privy Council.118  For example, the Privy Council heard eight appeals
110. See, e.g., Michael Anthony Lilla, Promoting the Caribbean Court of Justice as the
Final Court of Appeal for States of the Caribbean Community, 66 (2008), available at http:/
/www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%20Careers/CEDP%20Papers/
2008/Lilla_CaribJustAsFinalCtAppeal.ashx (quoting a Caribbean lawyer lobbyist: “What
is the ‘reasonable man’ test in the Caribbean? Acts of provocation in England and the
Caribbean may not be the same. . . .In the Caribbean, even express words may have
different connotations.”).
111. See, e.g., The World Factbook, CIA.GOV, https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/fields/2119.html (last visited May 7, 2014) (stating that
Montserrat has a population of roughly 5,000 people).
112. See Byron Buckley, Jamaica Must Get on Board CCJ, JAMAICA GLEANER (July 1,
2012), http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120701/focus/focus2.html#.T_MhtMU7J
zc.blogger (stating that Jamaican lawyers have been practicing before the CCJ even
though Jamaica has yet to enact CCJ enabling legislation with respect to appellate
jurisdiction).
113. See generally Appellate Jurisdiction Judgments, supra note 35 (listing each appel- R
late judgment of the CCJ separately; an internet search of the lawyers listed within the
judgments reveals Caribbean based lawyers and law firms).
114. Id.
115. Original Jurisdiction Judgments, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www
.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/judgments-proceedings/original-jurisdiction-judgments
(last visited May 7, 2014).
116. See About the CCJ: FAQs, supra note 16. R
117. Id.
118. Compare Appellate Jurisdiction Judgments, supra note 35, with Privy Council R
Appeal Statistics, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20101103140224/http://www.privy-council.org.uk/output/Page34.asp (last visited
May 7, 2014).
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from Barbados during the five years immediately before the state ceded
jurisdiction to the CCJ;119 in the five years immediately after, the CCJ has
heard twelve appeals from Barbados.120  Guyana proves to be a more diffi-
cult comparison, since it had abolished appeals to the Privy Council in
1970,121 but it has been appealing to the CCJ at an exponentially increas-
ing rate since it enacted domestic enabling legislation.122  Finally, Belize,
which ceded appellate jurisdiction to the CCJ in 2010,123 has appealed to
the court four times in 2012, twice in 2013, and already three times in the
first five months of 2014,124 whereas it appealed to the Privy Council
roughly twice year before that.125
Thus, although the CCJ has not been able to instantly gain jurisdiction
over all the islands of the Caribbean, it has begun the process and its num-
bers have been growing, both in terms of an increasing number of appeals
and an increasing number of states that have ceded jurisdiction to the
court.
D. Summary
The Privy Council served as a viable and useful mechanism during
the Caribbean’s colonial phase, and even during the infancy of its indepen-
dent phase.  Now, however, CARICOM has provided a more suitable option
in the form of the CCJ.  Although, the court requires Caribbean states to
fund and manage their own avenue for appeals, each state gains much from
their investment: a regional court with careful checks and balances on its
neutrality, a modern and efficient process, reduced costs to litigants, and
the creation of a body of Caribbean jurisprudence.
III. The CCJ Measured against the ECJ and the SADCT
A. Introduction to Sustainability and Efficacy
This Note will attempt to evaluate the success of a regional court based
on three factors: (1) political sustainability, (2) economic sustainability,
and (3) rate of growth and efficacy.  Political sustainability will be used to
describe the extent to which the governments and citizens of member
states are satisfied by the performance of a regional court.  Since regional
entities require the accession and support of member states, no regional
119. See Privy Council Appeal Statistics, supra note 118. R
120. Appellate Jurisdiction Judgments, supra note 35. R
121. See Byron & Dakalias, supra note 48, at 123 n.18 (the domestic court of appeals R
in Guyana became the country’s highest court).
122. Appellate Jurisdiction Judgments, supra note 35 (with one, then three, then twelve R
appeals in each of the three years immediately following Guyana’s enabling legislation).
123. See Good Bye: Belize Abolishes All Appeals to Privy Council, DOMINICA NEWS
ONLINE (May 13, 2010), http://dominicanewsonline.com/news/homepage/news/crime-
court-law/good-bye-belize-abolishes-all-appeals-to-privy-council/.
124. Appellate Jurisdiction Judgments, supra note 35. R
125. See Privy Council Appeal Statistics, supra note 118; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Judicial
and Court Statistics 2009, 160 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/down
loads/statistics/mojstats/jcs-stats-2009-211010.pdf.
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court can be successful unless it sufficiently pleases its constituents.  Eco-
nomic sustainability will be used to describe the way a regional court gen-
erates income to fund its processes.  Lastly, though a regional court’s
sustainability and continued existence is important, it must exist in a
meaningful way.  The last factor will thus give credit to the reach and effect
of a regional court’s jurisdiction to determine its efficacy in creating a
binding standard of law among member states.
B. The ECJ
1. Introduction
This section will neither attempt to fully analyze the ECJ’s history and
relationship with the European Union (EU) nor examine the various
branches of the court; rather, this section will highlight certain aspects of
the ECJ’s general sustainability to create a benchmark from which to ana-
lyze the relative sustainability of the CCJ.  As will be explained, the ECJ
carries with it high political and economic sustainability, yet it does not
sacrifice efficacy as a regional court.  As a result, it will be used to set a
high bar for regional courts.
2. Political Sustainability
The political sustainability of a regional court depends on the sense of
legitimacy and authority it can cultivate among the individuals within its
jurisdiction and, more importantly, the extent to which its performance
satisfies the governments of its constituent states.  This Note will attempt
to understand these abstract concepts by examining three factors: (1) the
court’s system for appointing and removing judges, (2) the court’s system
for rendering judicial decisions, and (3) the nature of the judicial decisions
ultimately rendered.
Regarding the first factor, the ECJ’s enabling treaties offer only a bare
outline for judicial appointments.126  This outline requires only that there
be a lack of overlap between judicial and political or administrative
office,127 as well as a mandate for judges who “possess the qualifications
required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective
countries,” and those whose “independence is beyond doubt.”128  In fact,
until the Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2007,129 the requirement of at
least one judge per member state was not listed in any treaty at all.130
Thus, the selection process is very open to the discretion of the EU states
126. See Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 253– 55, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter Consolidated Treaty
of the EU]; Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union art. 4,
Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 210 [hereinafter Protocol Statute of ECJ].
127. Protocol Statute of the ECJ, supra note 126, art. 4. R
128. Consolidated Treaty of the EU, supra note 126, art. 253. R
129. Treaty of Lisbon amending the treaty on European Union and the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community art. 9F, Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 22.
130. See Paul Craig, The Jurisdiction of the Community Courts Reconsidered, 36 TEX.
INT’L L. J. 555, 568 (2001) (noting, however, that the requirement of at least one judge
per state was followed through long-standing practice).
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and can be partially masked behind a veil of secrecy.131  Moreover,
although ultimate appointment is subject to “common accord” of all the
member states,132 each individual state usually nominates its own repre-
sentative through internal processes,133 further subtracting from overall
transparency.
The ECJ’s structure, though, does supply a check on judicial appoint-
ment by creating an advisory panel whose job is to render opinions on the
suitability of jurists being considered for admission to the court.134  This
panel is made up of seven members; eligibility is open to former members
of the ECJ, members of national supreme courts, and “lawyers of recog-
nized competence.”135  However, this check appears to be structurally
weak, employing loose guidelines.136  Thus, in the ECJ, it appears that
legitimacy of judicial appointments depends not on explicit law, but rather
on more intangible enforcement mechanisms.
As for removal of judges, the ECJ employs better-defined mechanisms.
Here, judges do not hold life tenure as U.S. federal judges do;137 instead,
appointment is for a renewable term of six years.138  Besides expiration of
term, a judge may exit the courting one of only three ways: (1) death, (2)
voluntary resignation, or (3) removal by unanimous agreement of the
court.139
The interplay between the conditions for judicial appointment and the
conditions for renewal create an interesting phenomenon.  Judges are
expected to be non-partisan and without bias towards their home coun-
tries, but are appointed through an opaque process that allows member
states to exert political pressure upon their representatives both at appoint-
ment and renewal.140  Although these circumstances do not seem to foster
political sustainability, two complementary underlying processes do.
First, the loosely codified formal requirements placate states in their fear of
131. See Ana Martins, Size and Composition of Highest Courts –  Selection of Judges, in
THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPEKTIVE 203, 209
(Ingof Pernice et al. eds., 2005).
132. Consolidated Treaty of the EU, supra note 126, art. 253. R
133. See Martins, supra note 131, at 209.  A state’s nominations are rarely ever chal- R
lenged by the EU as a body, and so, one could argue that the decision primarily takes
place at a national level. See Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appoint-
ments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 387, 401 (2008);but see Judicial Reach: The Ever-Expanding Euro-
pean Court of Justice, WORLD AFFAIRS, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/
judicial-reach-ever-expanding-european-court-justice (last visited May 7, 2014) (stating
that, in recent years, six candidates are publicly known to have been denied admission
to the court).
134. Consolidated Treaty of the EU, supra note 126, art. 255. R
135. Consolidated Treaty of the EU, supra note 126, art. 255. R
136. See Martins, supra note 131, at 209. R
137. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
138. Consolidated Treaty of the EU, supra note 126, art. 253. R
139. Protocol Statute of the ECJ, supra note 126, art. 5– 6 (removal here is appropriate R
when the judge has been found to no longer “fulfill the requisite conditions” or “meets
the obligations arising from his office”).
140. Kevin Andrew Swartz, Powerful, Unique and Anonymous: The European Court of
Justice and its Continuing Impact on the Formation of the European Community, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 687, 692 (1993).
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losing sovereignty to a regional court.141  This, in turn, encourages more
states to sign the treaty and place themselves within reach of the court,
bolstering the court’s perceived legitimacy in the eyes of individuals and
states alike.142
The second part of the answer to the legitimacy question lies in the
way that judicial decisions are rendered.  While member states are satisfied
by having reasonable control over their representative judges, the judges
themselves are insulated from excessive political pressure by having their
individual decisions remain unknown.143  Judicial decisions are written as
though the court is speaking with one voice: opinions are released
unsigned, without minority opinions, and without record of the number of
judges that voted for the ruling and the number that voted against it.144  In
fact, the opinion itself is brief and written in a straightforward, syllogistic
manner rather than a conversational one, negating any chance of deducing
the writer from her style.145  Thus, a state using political pressure to force a
judge to rule a certain way would have minimal effect, since it would be
difficult to determine whether or not the judge complied.
The last concern surrounding the political sustainability of the ECJ
deals with the substantive nature of the decisions rendered by the court.  In
this regard, the ECJ has been able to appease member states.  But, rather
than striking a permanent balance between member state sovereignty and
EU interests, the court has slowly and carefully advanced the primacy of
EU law over a span of multiple decades.146  When the ECJ was initially
formed in 1952, its powers of original jurisdiction did not reach individual
citizens, meaning it could only enforce EU law on member states them-
selves.147  Eleven years later, the court determined that EU law protected
citizens of member states as well.148  Just one year after that, the court
established the concept of supremacy, stating that EU law contravened the
national law of any contrary member state.149  Then, twenty-six years later,
the court granted this supremacy power to member state national courts,
allowing them to overrule national laws that violated EU laws.150  Even
141. See WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
437 (6th ed. 2011).
142. See, e.g., John Hart & Shannon Kile, Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and
Weapons Proliferation, 6 (2002), available at http://cns.miis.edu/mnsg/pdfs/discuss.pdf
(suggesting movement toward fulfilling the goals of a treaty as more states sign on to it).
143. See Michael Rosenfeld, Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 618, 635 (2006).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 634– 35.
146. See, e.g., Court of Justice of the European Union, CIVITAS, http://www.civitas
.org.uk/eufacts/download/IN.5.ECJ.pdf (last updated July 27, 2011) (discussing the
landmark cases that led up to EU law primacy).
147. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community art. 33, Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
148. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1. 40.
149. Case C-6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
150. Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd.,
1990 E.C.R. I-2433.
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now, the ECJ continues to strengthen the EU community by strengthening
the law that binds member states to one another.151
Thus, for the ECJ, political sustainability does not lie in enforcing
rigid rules and demanding transparency; it lies instead in the subtlety of
giving each member state a means of protecting her own interests while
still slowly advancing the interests of the group.
3. Economic Sustainability
The ECJ receives most of its funding directly from its parent entity, the
EU,152 though it does generate some income from internal processes.153
The EU itself derives funds from three main sources: (1) customs duties
imposed on non-EU imports, (2) a partial levy on the Value Added Tax
(VAT) received by each member state, and (3) a payment from each mem-
ber state based proportionately on its Gross National Income (GNI) rela-
tive to other member states.154  The last two sources, which come directly
from member states, account for about 87% of the revenue.155
The amount of funding the ECJ receives depends on the amount of
funding the EU decides to allocate to the judicial branch in the administra-
tive portion of its budget.156  The Multiannual Financial Framework maps
out the general framework of the budget and sets maximum expenditures
for six-year periods,157 while individual yearly budgets are scheduled to set
more precise values.158  As a result, the court could theoretically end up
saddled with insufficient funding for a period of years if circumstances
within Europe change too drastically.  In fact, with the continuing enlarge-
151. For a discussion on whether the relationship between EU law and member state
law is in fact a hierarchy or a more nuanced form of pluralism, see generally Pierre
Brunet, Pluralism, Values and the European Judge, 5– 7 (Feb. 21, 2011), available at http://
www.booksandideas.net/IMG/pdf/20120221_BrunetANGL.pdf.
152. See Definitive Adoption of the European Union’s General Budget for the Finan-
cial Year 2012, 2012 O. J. (L 56) 265 (Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://eur-lex.europa
.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:e648e711-9e69-4a8e-937c-e6b55791cf11.0009.02/DOC_1
&format=PDF.
153. See 2013 EU Line-By-Line Budget Section 4, Title 5, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
budget/data/DB/2013/en/SEC04.pdf (last visited May7, 2014) (these funds are gener-
ated through the sale and letting of property, through collecting on loans, and through
receiving interest on accounts).
154. See Where Does the Money Come From?, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa
.eu/budget/explained/budg_system/financing/fin_en.cfm (last visited May7, 2014).
Note that cash injections from the EU can outweigh the GNI based payments from some
countries. See Who Pays What?, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/
europe/04/money/html/who_pays_what.stm (last visited May7, 2014).
155. See Revenue of EU Budget 2012, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/
budget/financialreport/2012/revenue/index_en.html (last visited May 7, 2014).
156. See David Edward, Reform of Article 234 Procedure: the Limits of the Possible, in
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 119, 138 (David O’Keeffe ed., 2000) (noting
that the court receives only 2.7% of the total administrative budget, which is itself only a
small fraction of the EU budget as a whole).
157. See, e.g., Multiannual Financial Framework 2014– 2020 Roadmap, EUROPA.EU,
http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/multiannual-financial-framework-2014-2020/
index_en.htm (last visited May 7, 2014).
158. See id.; Financial Perspective 2000– 2006, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
shared/spl/hi/europe/04/money/html/financial.stm (last visited May 7, 2014).
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ment of the EU and the recent expansion of its powers through the Treaty
of Lisbon, the ECJ has been burdened with a growing backlog of cases.159
However, requests for additional funding to employ new judges have gone
unanswered.160
Despite the fact that funding may be vulnerable to temporary insuffi-
ciency, the court is still economically sustainable simply because of its ties
to the powerful EU.  Funding for the EU, and thus the ECJ, flows from the
financial success of member states and the entity as a whole.161  While not
all EU member states may currently be prosperous, the EU as a whole has
been relatively so.162  In fact, although the EU has not responded to some
requests for budget increases, it has consistently increased funding to the
ECJ since its inception, and the budget grew by 42% in just the eight years
leading up to 2014.163  It seems that as long as the EU continues to pros-
per, the ECJ will remain economically sustainable.
4. Rate of Growth and Efficacy
The ECJ did not achieve its large jurisdiction overnight.  The court
now has jurisdiction over the twenty-seven states that make up the EU,164
but when the EU’s predecessor was initially formed in 1951, there were
only six states within the supranational entity.165  It would be twenty-two
more years before any other states joined the entity, though three states
would join at once.166  After this initial addition, states started joining the
group more quickly: eight years for the next one, five for the two after that,
nine years for the next three states, and so on.167  Here, states were simul-
taneously signing on to the supranational group and ceding jurisdiction to
its court for the adjudication of European law.168
As the number of countries under the ECJ’s jurisdiction increased, the
number of cases being brought before the court increased exponentially:
159. See Constant Brand, Ministers Unsympathetic to ECJ’s Plea for More Judges, EURO-
PEAN VOICE (July 20, 2011), http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/ministers-
unsympathetic-to-ecj-s-plea-for-more-judges/71671.aspx.
160. See id.
161. See Where does the Money Come From?, supra note 154. R
162. See Angeline Vachris, Do the Recipient Countries of Cohesion Funds Need a “Get
Out of Jail Free Card?”, 11 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 86, 87 (2002).
163. See Draft General Budget of the European Union for the Financial Year 2012,7,
EUROPEAN UNION (2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0300&qid=1418124208506&from=EN (stating consistent
yearly increases in the budget starting from _250,000,00 in 2006) and The Court in
Figures, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_80908/ (last visited May 7, 2014)
(stating a budget of _355,000,000 for 2014).
164. See Patrick Birkinshaw, National Courts and European Union Courts, in EUROPEAN
UNION: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND SOLIDARITY 115, 127 (Jack Hayward & Ru¨diger Wurzel
eds., 2012).
165. See The History of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/eu-history/index_en.htm (last visited May 7, 2014).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Consolidated Treaty of the EU, supra note 126, art. 263 (stating that the ECJ R
“shall . . . have jurisdiction in actions brought by a member state”).
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the court’s workload was 79 cases a year in 1970,169 623 cases were pend-
ing by 1997,170 and 849 were pending by 2011.171  Of course, a large part
of this likely resulted from the court giving member state citizens a cause
of action against their government and other citizens for violation of EU
law.172  Although the ECJ had a relatively slow start during its earlier years,
the court has now grown into a powerful judicial body that Europeans take
full advantage of.
5. Summary
The ECJ bears all the marks of success.  It has satisfied its member
states while still developing and strengthening itself as an entity.  It has
secured economic stability through the status of being attached to a power-
ful parent organization.  It has grown consistently as a judicial body, both
in terms of its size and the scope of jurisdiction.  In short, the ECJ has set a




The SADCT is the judicial body under the South African Development
Community (SADC), an inter-governmental organization that connects fif-
teen South African states.173  The general goals of the SADC, much like
other regional organizations, are increasing the economic prosperity of the
region (partially through promoting free trade) and promoting political,
social and cultural cooperation.174  The SADCT was created with the
power to promote these goals by having original jurisdiction over disputes
between member states,175 individuals and member states,176 member
states and the SADC,177 and individuals and the SADC.178  Although the
169. See Court of Justice of the European Union, supra note 146. R
170. See Statistical Information on the Court of Justice 1997, 3, CURIA (1998), available
at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/st97cr_2008-09-
30_16-42-41_25.pdf.
171. See Annual Report 2011, 95, CURIA (2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu/
jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-06/ra2011_version_integrale_en.pdf.
172. See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belast-
ingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. 40.
173. See About the Tribunal, S. AFR. DEV. CMTY. TRIBUNAL, http://www.sadc-tribunal
.org/?page_id=1176 (last visited May 7, 2014); Member States, SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOP-
MENT COUNCIL, http://www.sadc.int/member-states (last visited May 7, 2014) (listing
current member states).
174. See Muna Ndulo, African Integration Schemes: A Case Study of the South African
Development Community (SADC), 7 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 13– 15 (1999).
175. S. AFRICAN DEV. CMTY. Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure Thereof, art. 15,
(Aug. 7, 2000), available at http://www.sadc.int/files/1413/5292/8369/Protocol_on_
the_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof2000.pdf [hereinafter SADCT Protocol].
176. Id.
177. Id. art. 17 (stating that jurisdiction here would be exclusive).
178. Id. art. 18 (stating that jurisdiction here would be exclusive).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN308.txt unknown Seq: 22 12-JAN-15 11:49
756 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
SADCT was established with these ambitious goals and others179 in mind,
its existence proved brief and tumultuous due to an absence of political
and economic sustainability.
2. Political Sustainability
As stated above,180 this Note will attempt to evaluate the political sus-
tainability of a regional court through its system for judicial appointment
and removal, its system of rendering decisions, and the substantive nature
of the decisions themselves.  Here, judicial eligibility is conditioned on
loose requirements similar to those in the ECJ’s system: SADCT jurists are
eligible for judge hood if they do not hold political or administrative
office181 and if they have the “qualifications required for highest judicial
office” in their home state or are simply of “recognized competence.”182
Also similar to the current process of the ECJ, each member state may
nominate one of their citizens to serve as a judge of the court, with the
SADC choosing the judges from the nominees.183  No more than one judge
from each member state can serve at a time.184  Unlike the ECJ, however,
the SADCT does not require one judge from each member state, and is
considered full once it has at least ten members.185
As for reappointment, SADCT judges serve for renewable terms of five
years186 and are thus vulnerable to the same sort of political pressure as
ECJ judges.187  Moreover, the SADC chooses the five permanent members
of the court, adding an extra layer of pressure to the selection process.188
Unlike the ECJ system, however, the SADCT’s system for rendering deci-
sions does not provide insulation from political pressure.  Decisions of the
court come with a majority opinion signed by the delivering justice, a list
of the number of justices that voted for and against a ruling, and some-
times even signed dissenting opinions.189  Most tellingly, among the
twenty decisions listed in the SADCT’s records,190 only one has ever borne
a dissent,191 and that came in the court’s first year of operation; this sug-
gests that judges may be hesitant to abandon the relative security of the
179. See, e.g., S. AFR. DEV. CMTY., Protocol on Gender and Development, art. 3 (Aug. 17,
2008), available at http://www.sadc.int/files/8713/5292/8364/Protocol_on_Gender_
and_Development_2008.pdf (enacted with the goals of empowering women, eliminating
discrimination and achieving gender equality).
180. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. .
181. See SADCT Protocol, supra note 175, art. 9. R
182. See id. art. 3.
183. See id. art. 4.
184. See id. art. 3.
185. See id.
186. See id. art. 6.
187. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
188. See SADCT Protocol, supra note 175, art. 3. R
189. See, e.g. Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. v. Republic of Zimb., SADC(T) Case No. 2/
2007 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2007) [hereinafter Campbell].
190. See Decisions, S. AFR. DEV. CMTY. TRIBUNAL, http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/?page_
id=1872 (last visited May 7, 2014).
191. Campbell, SADC(T) Case No.2/2007, at  ¶¶ 90– 95, ¶¶ 96– 100 (two judges gave
partial dissents).
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majority decision and voice opinions that could cause them to be singled
out.
Although its system for publishing opinions was troublesome, the nail
in the SADCT’s coffin was actually the substantive nature of its decisions.
The SADCT’s relative failure can be primarily traced back to the decision
that bore the court’s only published dissent.192  That decision dealt with a
group of white farmers who brought suit against the government of
Zimbabwe, claiming they were discriminatorily dispossessed of their land
by the government’s land program.193  Although the SADCT did not have
appellate jurisdiction, it did provide for parties to bring suits against mem-
ber state governments for the purpose of enforcing SADC regional law
when all of a party’s local remedies had been exhausted.194  Here, the
court not only agreed to adjudicate the case, but it ultimately ruled against
the Zimbabwean government in a way that attempted to establish primacy
of SADC law over Zimbabwean local law.  The court held that the
Zimbabwean land program constituted de facto discrimination in direct
breach of member state obligations under the SADC treaty,195 and the
court ordered the government to end the dispossession process and com-
pensate those who had already been evicted.196  The government ignored
this ruling and evicted the farmers.197  Soon after, Zimbabwe challenged
the authority and legitimacy of the SADCT in front of the SADC, gaining
support from other member states as well.198  In the end, the SADC sus-
pended the operations of the court.199  Plans for the future of the court
initially ranged from limiting the scope of its jurisdiction solely to disputes
between member states— thus preventing individual citizens from having
standing200— to disbanding the SADCT entirely.201  Two years after the
court’s suspension, there have been no signs of restoration; the latter plan
appears to have prevailed.
192. See Zimbabwe Blamed for Collapse of SADC Tribunal, COMMERCIAL FARMERS UNION
OF ZIMBABWE (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.cfuzim.org/index.php/newspaper-articles-2/
the-courts/2930-zimbabwe-blamed-for-collapse-of-sadc-tribunal.
193. See Max du Plessis & Malebakeng Forere, Enforcing the SADC Tribunal’s Deci-
sions in South Africa: Immunity, 35 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L.J. 265, 265– 66 (2010).
194. See SADCT Protocol, supra note 175, art. 15. R
195. See du Plessis & Forere, supra note 193, at 265– 66. R
196. See id. at 266.
197. See id.  The SADCT eventually found Zimbabwe in contempt of court for its will-
ful dismissal of the court’s order. Id.
198. See Cleophas Tsokodayi, SADC Tribunal Decisions Null and Void, THE EXAMINER
(May 18, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/article/sadc-tribunal-decisions-null-and-
void-justice-ministers.
199. See id.
200. See Catherine Sasman, SADC Leaders Neuter Tribunal, THE NAMIBIAN (Aug. 21,
2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201208220540.html.
201. See Zvamaida Murwira, Southern Africa: Regional Leaders Permanently Disband
SADC Tribunal, WALL AFRICA (Aug. 21, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/2012082108
93.html.
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3. Economic Sustainability
Although the SADCT’s major downfall flowed from its lack of political
sustainability, the court also suffered from an absence of any checks to
maintain its economic sustainability.  The major source of the SADCT’s
funding problems was the court’s dependence on a supranational parent
entity that lacked the capacity to be financially independent: just over one-
third of the SADC’s yearly budget came from its member countries.202  The
majority of the funding for the SADC, and, therefore the SADCT, came from
international donors.203  In fact, the EU was one of the biggest contributors
to the SADCT itself.204
Though external funding may have posed theoretical problems regard-
ing independence of the court, it was ultimately the SADC’s disbursement
of the funds, or lack thereof, which caused grave practical problems.  When
the SADC decided to suspend the SADCT, it agreed to let four judges
remain to complete pending cases, though the court would be barred from
taking on any new matters.205  At that time, there were four pending cases,
most of which were brought by SADC-region individuals.206  However, the
remaining members of the court were unable to complete those four final
cases because of insufficient funds; judicial requests to the SADC for addi-
tional funding “fell on deaf ears.”207  Remarkably, the SADCT’s affairs were
so handicapped that it did not even have enough remaining resources to
hear cases aimed at challenging the SADC’s decision to refuse to allow new
petitions to reach the court.208
4. Rate of Growth and Efficacy
Unfortunately, the brief nature of the SADCT’s existence means there
is little to say about its growth.  The SADC itself started in 1992, develop-
202. See SADC Must Wean Itself from Donors, Control Own Budget, THE HERALD ONLINE
(Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-must-wean-itself-from-donors-control-
own-budget/ (noting that only $31,000,000 USD of SADCT’s $83,000,000 USD 2011
budget came from SADC member states).  This funding pattern was not an anomaly; the
proposed budget for 2007 held a similar distribution. See Mogae: Increase SADC Budget,
NEWS24 (Aug. 17, 2006), http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Mogae-Increase-SADC-
budget-20060817.
203. See SADC Must Wean Itself from Donors, Control Own Budget, supra note 202. R
204. See Tichaona Zindoga, SADC Should Put Its Money Where Its Mouth Is, THE
SOUTHERN TIMES (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.southerntimesafrica.com/news_article
.php?id=7429&title=SADC%20should%20put%20its%20money%20where%20its%20
mouth%20is&type=83 (other contributors included individual European states like the
U.K. and Germany).
205. See Ariranga Pillay, Former President, S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Tribunal, Addresses in
Johannesburg and Windhoek: Tribunal Dissolved By Unanimous Decision of SADC
Leaders, 11 (July, 2011), available at http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/article/
files/Speech%20by%20former%20President%20of%20SADC%20Tribunal.pdf.
206. See Catherine Sasman, Kawana Defends SADC Tribunal Suspension, THE NAMIBIAN
(July 15, 2011), http://www.namibian.com.na/indexx.php?archive_id=82639&page_
type=archive_story_detail&page=2229.
207. See Pillay, supra note 205, at 11.
208. See id.
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ing out of an earlier South African organization in the region.209  Though
the 1992 SADC enabling treaty technically created the SADCT,210 judges
were not appointed to the court until 2005.211  A fire in early 2007 further
delayed the commencement of judicial work.212  Finally, more than fifteen
years after the supposed creation of the court, the first dispute was filed in
August 2007.213  Less than four years later, in mid-2011, the SADC sus-
pended the court.214
Even during the fifteen years between the SADCT’s “creation” and its
first filing, the court’s jurisdiction was growing.  In 1992, only ten states
were a part of SADC.215  One more state joined in 1994, another in 1995,
two more in 1997, and the last in 2005, bringing the total number of states
to fifteen.216  Although these states were signing on to a regional court’s
jurisdiction for matters of regional law, it was a court that had never ren-
dered a decision.  When the first unfavorable decision fell, the judgment
was ignored and the court was essentially terminated.217  The SADCT sim-
ply never had the chance to grow as a judicial body.
5. Summary
The SADCT boasted a progressive mentality and possessed judges
unafraid of making unpopular decisions.  From a theoretical perspective,
the court was nobly designed and nobly effectuated.  From a practical per-
spective, it may have been doomed to fail from the start.  The SADCT ulti-
mately collapsed due to an absence of checks in place to maintain political
and economic sustainability.  As a result, it will be used to set a practical
low bar against which other regional courts can be evaluated.
D. The CCJ
1. Introduction
Now that a low and a high mark have been set for judging regional
courts, this section will place the CCJ on the resulting spectrum.  This sec-
tion will attempt to show that the CCJ and CARICOM lack the immense
strength of the ECJ and EU, but have created a framework built with great
potential for growth and, more importantly, that is designed with checks in
place to promote sustainability.
209. See Ndulo, supra note 174, at 8. R
210. Treaty of the South African Development Community art 9, Aug. 17, 1992, avail-
able at http://www.sadc.int/files/9113/5292/9434/SADC_Treaty.pdf.
211. See History of the Tribunal, S. AFR. DEV. COUNCIL TRIBUNAL, http://www.sadc-tri
bunal.org/?page_id=1165 (last visited May 7, 2014).
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. See Pillay, supra note 205, at 6. R
215. See Ndulo, supra note 174, at 11. R
216. See History and Treaty, S. AFR. DEV. CMTY., http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/over
view/history-and-treaty/ (last visited May 7, 2014).
217. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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2. Political Sustainability
As before, the first stage of a political sustainability analysis will focus
on the court’s system for judicial appointment and removal.  With regards
to appointment, eligibility for the CCJ requires qualifications slightly more
rigid than those required by the ECJ and SADCT.  Beyond general require-
ments like “high moral character” and “integrity,” a CCJ judge must have
one of two kinds of experience: either (1) at least five years’ experience in a
court of unlimited jurisdiction in a Commonwealth country or contracting
state, or (2) at least fifteen years practicing or teaching law in a contracting
state or a state with a similar jurisprudence.218
The framework of the CCJ also adds an extra check on appointment
through the creation of the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commis-
sion (the Commission).219  Rather than allowing political pressure to reach
judges through member state appointment, the CCJ-enabling statute
instead created an independent eleven-person body to decide judicial
admission.220  Even appointment to the Commission itself is handled by
relatively independent jurists, including the deans of the law school at the
University of the West Indies and other law schools in contracting states
(jointly responsible for two nominations), as well as the Organization of
the Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Association and the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States Bar Association (also jointly responsible for two
nominations).221  Moreover, the Commission does not consider potential
judges by recommendations from contracting states, but by a prospective
judge’s individual application.222
The Commission’s duties are not only limited to initial judicial
appointment; it is also responsible for initiating proceedings to remove a
judge (for inability to perform or misbehavior)223 and for recommending
an increase in the number of judicial positions in the court.224  One point
is important to note, however; there is a potential avenue for political influ-
ence through the President of the court.  Unlike the other judges of the
court, the President is appointed or removed by the majority vote of three
quarters of contracting states, with the Commission only serving to make
recommendations.225  The President also serves as the Chairman of the
Commission, creating further possible issues.226  However, CARICOM
placed a large check on this potential complication: while normal judges of
218. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. IV. R
219. Id. art.V.
220. See Philip Dayle, Caribbean Court of Justice: A Model for International Courts, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/sep/10/caribbean-
court-judges-selection.
221. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art.V. R
222. See Mark Beckford, CCJ Judges: Quality, Method of Appointment Debated, JAMAICA
GLEANER (Dec. 7, 2009), http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20091207/lead/lead7.html
(citing the statement of a Caribbean attorney who noted that, although the application
process promoted transparency, he found it “demeaning” to judges).
223. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. IX. R
224. Id. art. IV.
225. Id.
226. Id. art.V.
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the CCJ have life tenure until the age of seventy-two, the President of the
court may only serve for one non-renewable seven year term.227  Thus,
unlike the judges in the ECJ and the SADCT, judges of the CCJ are able to
make decisions without considering judicial term renewal; one way or
another, renewal is functionally non-existent.
The next stage in the analysis of political sustainability will explore
the way in which the court renders its decisions.  Three or five judges usu-
ally hear appellate jurisdiction cases228 while five judges will usually hear
original jurisdiction cases.229  Decisions of the court are rendered with
signed majority opinions, concurrences and dissents, as well as a record of
which judges voted for the ruling and which voted against it.230  As a
result, CCJ opinions do not shield judges behind a singular and collective
“voice of the court” as the ECJ does;231 however, this may actually help, by
giving transparency to a regional court operating in a region where most of
its citizens are distrustful of their local judiciaries.232  So whereas trans-
parency may have been a liability in the SADCT, it becomes a checking
mechanism on judges in the CCJ, one that is aimed at inspiring a sense of
legitimacy in the inhabitants of the region.  And, while transparency keeps
judges accountable to individuals, the combination of the Commission and
lifetime tenure simultaneously act as a check on contracting state govern-
ments, creating a safeguard unavailable in the SADCT and the ECJ.  CCJ
judges are able to make their decisions in a visible way, yet are still insu-
lated from governmental forces that may disagree with them.
The final, and most serious, aspect of political sustainability lies in the
substantive nature of the decisions rendered by the CCJ.  In the years lead-
ing up to the formation of the CCJ, the biggest question among Caribbean
states and citizens was how the court would rule on cases challenging the
death penalty.233  Human rights activists feared that the CCJ would
become a “hanging court” as states ceded appellate criminal jurisdiction
away from the Privy Council and to the CCJ.234  This concern was trig-
gered by a string of Privy Council decisions in the last thirty years that
limited Caribbean states in the way that they could exercise the death pen-
alty.235  These decisions included a ruling that barred a mandatory death
227. Id. art. IX.
228. See Appellate Jurisdiction Judgments, supra note 35. R
229. See Original Jurisdiction Judgments, supra note 115.
230. See, e.g., Boyce v. Barbados, CCJ Appeal No CV 2 of 2005 (Caribbean Ct. Just.
2006) (all seven of the presiding judges rendered separate opinions).
231. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
232. See UNDP Report, supra note 49, at 31. R
233. See David Simmons, The Caribbean Court of Justice: A Unique Institution of Carib-
bean Creativity, 29 NOVA L. REV. 171, 186 (2005).
234. See, e.g., Wolfe-Robinson & Bowcott, supra note 75. R
235. See AMNESTY INT’L, Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human
Rights Issue, 16– 17 (2012), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
AMR05/001/2012/en/e17a43ad-54d7-4ea2-b93a-9c4d0b4821c1/amr050012012en
.pdf.
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penalty in Jamaica236 and one that found that executions meant to take
place more than five years after sentencing were inhumane enough to war-
rant mitigation of the sentence to life imprisonment.237  But, due largely to
the fact that murders rates are very high in the Caribbean,238 the popula-
tions of most states in the region overwhelmingly support capital punish-
ment.239  The Privy Council decisions were, therefore, very unpopular.240
In fact, some scholars believed the CCJ was created to enforce the death
penalty laws that the Privy Council began to disallow.241
The CCJ has responded carefully to allegations of it being a “hanging
court.”  Formal statements by CCJ judges have been vague, alluding to the
fact that while the court would balance international concerns with local
needs,242 it was not ruling out the death penalty entirely.243  The actions of
the court, while seemingly equally nuanced, hint at a clearer trend.  In
2006, Barbados lodged an appeal with the CCJ essentially challenging the
Privy Council’s ruling that executions must take place within five years
sentencing or not at all.244  Barbados sought to overturn the Privy Coun-
cil’s reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment in these scenarios
and reinstate capital punishment.245  The court, however, ruled against
Barbados, upholding the principles stated by the Privy Council years
before.246  Thus, it seems that the CCJ is making sure that it proceeds
slowly in what is surely dangerous territory.  The court has not yet
advanced any controversial goals that would step too heavily on the sover-
eignty of contracting states, but it has been careful to not take any steps
back from the foundation that was laid by the Privy Council.
It appears that the court is more closely following in the footsteps of
the ECJ than the SADCT.  Perhaps the major downfall of the SADCT was
that it stepped too far too quickly, provoking member states under its juris-
diction in only its first year of operation.247  The ECJ, on the other hand,
236. Lambert Watson v. The Queen (Att’y Gen. for Jam. Intervening), [2005] 1 A.C.
472 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
237. Pratt v. Att’y Gen. for Jam., [1993] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.). In a
way, this meant barring the death penalty entirely, since appeals to the Privy Council
often took more than five years. See Hanging Them High, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 30,
2008), http://www.economist.com/node/12855409.
238. See Hanging Them High, supra note 237. R
239. See Therese Mills, Letter: Colonial Power over the Death Penalty, BBC NEWS, http:/
/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4185745.stm (last updated Jan. 19, 2005).
240. See Robert Verkaik, Law: Last Appeal to a Lost Empire, THE INDEPENDENT (May 25,
1999), http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/law-last-appeal-to-a-lost-
empire-1095796.html.
241. See Weston Eidson, The Caribbean Court of Justice: An Institution Whose Time Has
Come, 8 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 166, 197 (2008).
242. See, e.g., Wolfe-Robinson & Bowcott, supra note 75. R
243. See, e.g., Megan Reynolds, Caribbean Court of Justice Maintains ‘Balanced’
Approach to Death Penalty, THE TRIBUNE, Jan. 29, 2010, at 3, available at http://
ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/UF/00/08/42/49/01495/00001-29-2010.pdf.
244. See Boyce v. Barbados, CCJ Appeal No CV 2 of 2005 (Caribbean Ct. Just. 2006).
245. See A Landmark Death Penalty Ruling by the Caribbean Court of Justice, FIDH
(Nov. 17, 2006), http://www.fidh.org/en/americas/Barbados.
246. Id.
247. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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moved slowly, waiting eleven years before it attempted to increase its
regional authority and taking rare incremental steps over the course of sev-
eral decades after that.248  Similarly, the CCJ is standing firm and is still
subtly advancing other goals while remaining cautious in pushing the most
controversial issues surrounding the court.  In 2012, the court faced a peti-
tion from migrant workers formerly employed at a Belizean fruit orchard
company who claimed that the company fired them because of their
attempts to unionize.249  Despite the fact that there was no “smoking gun,”
the court ruled against the company, reinstating the amount of damages
set by the Belizean trial court that the appeals court had reduced.250  This
decision is particularly important for the future of Belize with respect to
the relation between business and human rights, since the country is home
to many companies that employ significant numbers of migrant workers
and indigenous people.251  A regional court that respects and protects
unions could vastly improve the state of labor laws in such an area.
While the CCJ strategizes its substantive decisions, it has not forgotten
about procedure.  In 2012, the court made plans to sign a Memorandum of
Understanding with the U.S.-based National Center for State Courts in an
attempt to increase the “delivery of justice” to Caribbean citizens.252  This
may serve as an extra check on CARICOM governments by showing that
the CCJ has international connections with groups committed to improv-
ing access to justice, and not just ones committed to giving funds, as was
the case with SADCT’s foreign contributors.
Thus, it seems here that the CCJ has achieved a relatively high level of
political sustainability.  It has limited the influence of contracting state
governments, maximized judicial independence, increased judicial visibil-
ity to Caribbean citizens, and mollified voices of concern, while advancing
the Caribbean region as a responsible player in the modern world.
3. Economic Sustainability
Two major problems plagued the economic sustainability of the
SADCT: (1) it was too dependent on a parent that eventually considered it
an imprudent investment, and (2) the parent itself was unable to generate
the requisite funds.253  Although the ECJ may not have problems of the
second sort, it could run into issues with the first, since the court is
entirely dependent on the six year budget planned by its parent.254  The
CCJ, however, is tied to an economic power much weaker than the EU, and
248. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
249. Mayan King Ltd. v. Reyes, CCJ Appeal No CV 3 of 2011 ¶ 1 (Caribbean Ct. Just.
2012).
250. Id ¶¶ 22, 89.
251. See Nadia Bernaz, Important Decision of the Caribbean Court of Justice on Labor
Rights, RIGHTS AS USUAL (July 11, 2012), http://rightsasusual.com/?p=177.
252. See CCJ to Sign MOU to Improve Delivery of Justice in the Caribbean, THE NEW
YORK CARIB NEWS (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.nycaribnews.com/news.php?viewStory=
2878.
253. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
254. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
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has sought to circumvent both problems by creating the CCJ Trust
Fund.255
As explained in Section II, one reason for establishing the fund was to
ensure the independence of the body by preventing direct financial ties
between contracting states and the salaries of judges or the operations of
the court.256  A direct consequence of this system is the creation of a signif-
icant level of economic sustainability.  The Trust Fund was established
with an initial amount of $100,000,000 USD.257  Although this may seem
small in light of the SADC’s $83,000,000 USD annual budget258 and the
ECJ’s _355,000,000 annual budget,259 one must remember that the SADC
has a population more than thirteen times the size of CARICOM’s and that
the EU has a population more than thirty times CARICOM’s.260
The real strength of the fund, however, is not its initial size, but its
process of disbursement.  The $100,000,000 USD fund is managed by a
group of individuals selected for their independence, range of backgrounds
and financial skills.261  CARICOM planned to have the court operate
predominantly from the income generated by the fund through prudent
investing.262  This system is far from perfect since it is highly dependent on
the state of the global market; some years the fund has generated profits
while other years it has suffered losses.263  At the very least, however, it
adds an extra layer of economic sustainability.  And, even if the fund
should fail, the court can still request additional financial injections from
contracting parties or external sources if all states agree to it.264  Thus, the
CCJ is protected by multiple levels of economic safety nets: an initial large
fund reserved solely for the court, the prospect of the fund generating
income to cover the court’s operational costs, and the ability to request
additional funding from contracting states should both other safety nets
fail.
255. See Agreement Establishing CCJ Trust Fund, supra note 51, art. XVIII. R
256. See discussion supra Part II.A. .
257. See CCJ Trust Fund, supra note 89. R
258. See SADC Must Wean Itself from Donors, Control Own Budget, supra note 202. R
259. See The Court in Figures, supra note 163. R
260. Compare SADC Countries at a Glance, SADC TRADE, http://www.sadctrade.org/
sadcsummarytext (last visited May 7, 2014) (stating that the SADC has an overall popu-
lation of about 213 million people), and European Demography, EUROSTAT (July 28,
2011), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-28072011-AP/EN/3-28
072011-AP-EN.pdf (stating that the EU has an overall population of about 502 million
people) with HECORA, Strategic Plan on Health and Related Social Services in the CAR-
ICOM, 4 (2008), available at http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/services_re
gime/concept_paper_health.pdf (stating that CARICOM has an overall population of
about 15 million people).
261. See Agreement Establishing CCJ Trust Fund, supra note 51, art. VI– VII. R
262. See CCJ Trust Fund, supra note 89. R
263. See, e.g., CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE TRUST FUND, supra note 96; Bravo, supra
note 100.
264. Agreement Establishing CCJ Trust Fund, supra note 51, art. IV, §§ 2, 7. R
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4. Rate of Growth and Efficacy
The CCJ differs from the ECJ and the SADCT in one very important
way.  Though the ECJ was formed concurrently with the EU and the
SADCT was technically formed concurrently with the SADC, the CCJ was
created separately from, and, indeed, twenty-eight years after its parent
entity, CARICOM.265  As a result, states can still be members of CARICOM
without ceding appellate jurisdiction to its court.266  Here, from an absolu-
tist perspective, growth has been seemingly slow.  The court was created in
2001,267 and four years passed before the first states, Guyana and Barba-
dos, signed on to the court’s appellate jurisdiction in 2005.268  Belize fol-
lowed suit in 2010, but it was the last to do so thus far.269  Caribbean
countries have advanced different reasons for not ceding jurisdiction; Trini-
dad and Tobago, for example, fears losing the Privy Council because it
believes that the British body “inspires confidence in foreign investors.”270
However, this hesitance to cede jurisdiction should not be viewed entirely
as a damning sign.  Rather than promote an SADCT-type situation, where
states immediately sign on to a court whose operation they have little
understanding of, states here are permitted to wait until they are comforta-
ble enough with the court to cede jurisdiction to it.  This is similar to the
system in the ECJ where only a few states signed on to the EU and ECJ,
with the rest joining slowly as time progressed.
Moreover, the potential growth of the CCJ cannot be judged only from
the speed at which states sign on to its appellate jurisdiction.  Original
jurisdiction of the court to decide CARICOM region law has been compul-
sory since the court was first formed.271  And, as happened with both the
ECJ272 and the SADCT,273 original jurisdiction alone can become a power-
ful tool for establishing the primacy of regional law.  As such, it is clearly
too soon to declare the CCJ stunted just barely a decade after it formed.
Regional courts require a certain amount of time to grow properly, and the
CCJ has already shown signs of proper growth.
265. See Treaty of Chaguaramas, supra note 13 (stating that the formation date of R
CARICOM is July 4, 1973); see also About the CCJ: FAQs, supra note 16 (stating that the R
agreement establishing the CCJ was signed on February 14, 2001).
266. See, e.g. Singh, supra note 85 (discussing this idea within the context of member
states making debt payments).
267. See About the CCJ: FAQs, supra note 16 (agreement establishing the CCJ was R
signed on February 14, 2001).
268. See Ruth Moisa Alleyne, Political Blockage, THE BARBADOS ADVOCATE (Apr. 11,
2012), http://www.barbadosadvocate.com/newsitem.asp?more=local&NewsID=23966.
269. Id.
270. See Tony Fraser, Jamaica, Trinidad and the CCJ, CARIBBEAN INTELLIGENCE, http://
www.caribbeanintelligence.com/content/jamaica-trinidad-and-ccj (last visited May 7,
2014) (quoting the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago).
271. See id.; Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 17, R
art. XVI.
272. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
273. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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5. Summary
The CCJ has created a remarkable array of devices meant to ensure the
political and economic sustainability of its operations.  It has found ways
to avoid the complications surrounding the SADCT while emulating suc-
cesses of the ECJ.  And beyond borrowing systems of other courts, it has
created bold new systems of its own, such as the Trust Fund, the Commis-
sion and the mixed system of judicial tenure.  This amalgam of old and new
has created a framework poised to build the CCJ into a successful regional
court.
Conclusion
CARICOM has created a novel hybridized court of appellate and origi-
nal jurisdiction in the CCJ and, as a result, it faces novel issues.  The CCJ
must simultaneously prove itself as an effective replacement for the Privy
Council and as a regional court capable of satisfying the region’s citizens
while still respecting international concerns.  Although checks are in place
to promote the court’s sustainability, its continued success still depends
heavily on the actions of CARICOM contracting states.  Perhaps one of the
biggest issues facing the court is that the very state that holds its seat,
Trinidad and Tobago, has not yet ceded appellate jurisdiction to the court.
Trinidad and Tobago stands in a unique position to contribute a huge
sense of legitimacy to the court, and its choice to do so would go a long
way towards ensuring the CCJ’s success.  And, if the court is able to con-
tinue safeguarding judicial independence while carefully promoting
regional integration, it may even be able to change the average Caribbean
citizen’s perception of the average Caribbean judiciary.  The CCJ has a big
job ahead of it, but it stands well-equipped to fulfill its role.
